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Volume 11, Number 1, Winter 1979

The Application of Section One of the Sherman
Act to East-West Trade Resale Restrictions
by Peter B. Fitzpatrick*
In this article the author is concerned with the extraterritorialapplication of the United States antitrust law to resale trade restrictions agreed to
between American andforeign corporations. Following an explanation of and
comparison between the various judicial, statutory and administrative standards applicable to resale trade restrictions, it is concluded that the
law remains unclear and unsettled, but capable nevertheless of being
applied with practical advantagesfor the American businessman.
I.

INTRODUCTION

T

HE DILEMMA OF the international application of the antitrust
laws lies in the post-war success of the American multinational corporation. In reaching to control the actions of these corporations
abroad those who apply the antitrust laws seek to maintain control
over the extraterritorial activities of entities which they have clear
authority to regulate in the domestic sphere. The use of the antitrust
laws to assert such control has a great deal of political appeal in a
period when the United States is increasingly conscious of the image
projected by American corporate activity abroad.' At the same time,
increasing the reach of the antitrust laws abroad opens the United
States to criticism for attempting to control the internal affairs of
sovereign nations. Critics say it smacks of imperialism.
Detente accentuated the dilemma of the antitrust laws in the international arena. For the first time American corporations could begin
to tap the vast potential of the Soviet market. But the opportunity
held a hidden threat, the potential competition of Soviet state corporations. In seeking to limit this threat, United States corporations have
run head-on into the problem of the international application of the
antitrust laws.
The predictability and stability of applicable laws are major
elements in establishing a foundation for trade relationships. In part,
* A.B. (1968),

Princeton University; J.D. (1973) University of Virginia.

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, while not part of the antitrust laws, is a
recent expression of Congressional concern for the American business image abroad.
Pub. L. No. 95-213 (1977), 92 Stat. 1494, Title 1.
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the confusing application of the antitrust laws can have a chilling effect
on East-West trade. 2 This article will attempt to delineate the extent
to which Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act applies to EastWest trade, focusing upon statutory and case law and the enforcement
policy of the Antitrust Division of the United States Justice Department.
II.

SALE RESTRICTION:

A MEANS OF LOWERING

THE RISK OF EXPORTING TECHNOLOGY AND KNOW-HOW

In the Spring of 1966, the thaw which was to become detente
found expression in the wilds of the Eurasian steppe. The Soviet Union
sought to build an automobile factory and came looking for a business
partner in the United States. After the Ford Motor Company rejected
a Soviet request to build the factory,' the Russians entered the enthusiastic embrace of Giovanni Agnelli of the Fiat Motor Company. In
a gesture of solidarity, the $800,000,000 plant, built on a bend in the
Volga River southeast of Moscow, was named Togliatti, after the
famous Italian Communist. Togliatti was to produce a version of the
Fiat 124 to be sold in the Soviet Union under the trade name
"Zhiguli." The same car is produced for export to the West under the
name "Lada." Total production was projected to reach 660,000 cars a
year by 1975.4
Agnelli viewed the building of Togliatti as one in a series of moves
to improve Fiat's world-wide market position. In Poland, Fiat's licensee
is Zeran; in Egypt, it is Nasr; in Yugoslavia, it is Zavodi Crvena
Zastava. The objective of the Togliatti operation, as well as the other
Fiat licensees, was to improve and diversify Fiat's world-wide product
line and to give Fiat an entree into Communist and developing country
markets.'
Other Western auto makers failed to perceive the advantage in
Fiat's Eastward move. They regarded it as a gamble of no mean proportions. What they saw was Fiat creating keen competition for itself
and for them. Selling plants and know-how to the Soviet Union was infusing the Soviet economy with the basic ingredients it lacked to be
2

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ANTITRUST IN EAST-WEST TRADE 1 (Advisory Com-

mittee on East-West Trade Meeting of March 10, 1976).

3 M.

GOLDMAN, DETENTE AND DOLLARS 37 (1975).
4 Multinationals:A Fiat is a Lada is a Zastava, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 12, 1972, at 32.

5 Id.
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able to compete in the West. The Soviet desire to earn hard currency
was well recognized. 6 But of more concern to Western auto producers
was the economic effect of the Soviet system of control. The Soviet
Union has a large, cheap, controlled labor pool and the capability of
diverting the flow of raw materials and finished products from the internal market to an external one. Coupling these aspects of a controlled
economy with advanced equipment and know-how created the potential of driving the Western auto producers from their traditional
markets.
The experience since 1966 has supported Fiat's critics. Without
drastically improving the roads and service infrastructure within the
Soviet Union, it would be difficult for the country to absorb 660,000
new cars a year. Thus a major portion of the Togliatti product has
been available for export with the benefit of producing hard currency
for the Soviets.
In 1972 the Soviet Union exported more than double the number
of cars exported in 1971. By 1973 the world-wide export of Soviet cars
was 121,000.1 The Soviet-built Lada 1200 is reputed to be both sturdier and more powerful and sells for ten percent less than its Italian
counterpart, the Fiat 124.8 Several years ago, it was noted that while a
Soviet citizen had to pay as much as $7,300 American, at official exchange rates, for a Togliatti Fiat, the Lada was being sold abroad for
$2,400 American. 9 The Soviet sale of Ladas in the West have not
driven anyone from the market, but it is posing a challenge to Fiat
and other Western auto producers. The Lada has just entered the
North American market through Canada and is selling there for $3,645
Canadian, almost 22 percent below the price of a Honda, the foreign
car with the greatest sales volume in Canada.' 0
The Fiat experience is one which has not been lost upon subsequent detente traders; however, attempts to restrict the resale of
Eastern produced goods in the West have raised the specter of prosecution under the United States antitrust laws. The continuing concern of
Western businessmen with regard to limiting Soviet and Eastern European resale in the West of products produced by plants and know-how
purchased from the West was brought out at a 1976 meeting of the
6

Id.

A

M. GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 137.
Multinationals: A Fiat is a Lada is a Zastava, note 4 supra.

9 M. GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 138.
10 N. Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1978, at D-1, col. 1.
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Advisory Committee on East-West Trade. Mr. Alfred Wentworth of the
Chase Manhattan Bank asked Mr. Joel E. Davidow of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department the following question:
I think many of us in American business live in a horror (sic) of
creating another Fiat deal with the Soviet Union, where they set up
the plant to manufacture for the Soviet market, but neglect to block
the Soviet exports of the same car, such as the Fiat, throughout the
rest of the world, with the result that the Lada is in Western Europe,
competing very advantageously with the Fiat.
Suppose we turn this around, and substitute instead of a Fiat a
United States manufacturer of some sort of equipment. He goes in and
negotiates a contract, and that contract says that the production of
this plant may be sold only in the Soviet Union, or can be sold only
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but specifically blocks them
from Western Europe and the United States.
Then if I, as the prospective distributor in this country of this
equipment, bring suit with the Justice Department claiming that you
are denying by this contract the American public from a very inexpensive piece of wonderful equipment, is there a case there?
Mr. Davidow did not directly respond to the question. Indeed, the
answer remains unclear. However, the deep concern of the American
business community about its liability in this area 2 warrants a review
of the law as it exists.
Let us take the above suggested fact pattern. A United States
manufacturer (XYZ Corp.) wishes to contract to sell a plant built according to the technological and know-how specifications of XYZ
Corp., including the necessary production machinery, to a Soviet trade
organization. XYZ Corp. wishes to include a clause in the sales contract to prevent the sale of plant product in the United States and
Western Europe where it has a well-established market position. The
question to be answered is, can the United States antitrust laws reach
these contract restrictions on sale of plant product?
It should be noted that although this article will not deal with the
problems of transgressions of Soviet law or European Community antitrust law, there may be issues under these laws which must be fully
resolved before entering into a contract for sale.

"

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 15.
See Confusion on Issue of How Antitrust Laws Apply to U.S. Firms Abroad

Seen Rising, Wall St. J., Nov. 16, 1977, at 13, col. 1.
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SHERMAN ACT ANALYSIS OF A RESTRICTION
ON SALE OF PLANT PRODUCT

Since our hypothetical situation involves a contract which is
arguably in restraint of trade, it is appropriate to restrict our analysis
to the jurisdictional reach of Section One of the Sherman Act. That
provision states that "[e]very contract . . .in restraint of trade or commerce . . .with foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal."' 3
A.

"Every Contract"

The "every contract" language of Section One is subject to the
"rule of reason" under which the court scrutinizes the conduct involved
and determines whether such conduct is unreasonable when its legitimate purpose is compared to its effect as a restraint on free competition.' 4 Over time, certain categories of conduct have come to be
regarded as illegal per se under the Sherman Act. The illegal per se
categories generally include price-fixing agreements, agreements
among competitors dividing geographic markets or groups of
customers, tying agreements, concerted refusal to deal and certain
kinds of reciprocity agreements;' 5 however, the per se illegality concept
has recently been questioned.' 6

" 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). While the Sherman Act prohibits anti-competitive trade
restraints, the Clayton Act prohibits anti-competitive acquisitions of corporate stock
and assets. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). The contractual sale to the Soviet trade corporation
entails no such acquisition. Therefore, the Clayton Act does not apply to our case. International merger cases under the Clayton Act will therefore not be discussed. See
United States v. CIBA Corp., [1970] Trade Cas. (CCH)
73, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
FTC v. Procter and Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Gillette Co.,
[1968] 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
4345.19 (D.C. Mass. 1968); United States v. The
Standard Oil Co., [1970] Trade Cas. (CCH)
72,988 (N.D. Ohio 1969). While they
will not be discussed in this article, it should be noted that private persons and the
Federal Trade Commission also have standing to sue for antitrust violations. The antitrust laws have been given greater reach through the vehicle of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45 & 64 (1976). See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384
U.S. 316 (1966), which indicates that the FTC can declare trade practices unfair if
they conflict with, even though they do not actually violate, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 & 12-27.
14 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,63 (1911).
"5See Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?,
8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 16, 20 (1974).
16 Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-59 (1977).
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B. The Sherman Act will apply to those activities which have an effect on United States commerce.
In the international sphere, only those contracts which "restrain"
United States commerce with foreign nations can be reached. The
"restraint of trade or commerce . ..with foreign nations" language of
Section One of the Sherman Act requires that a restraint affect the
flow of goods imported into or exported from the United States.' 7 The
restraint of foreign commerce rule has been applied when the restraining parties were foreign nationals,' 8 or United States citizens.' 9 Acts
committed by parties to restrain commerce have been prosecuted
whether committed within a foreign country, 20 or within the United
2
States. '

C. Varying positions regarding the threshold effect on United States
commerce which permit application of the Sherman Act
Case - Derived Standards
The statutory language "commerce with foreign nations" has
presented no barrier to extending the extraterritorial reach of the an1.

titrust laws. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, Learned
Hand addressed this issue saying "it is settled law . . . that any state
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders
which the state reprehends .... .22 "Consequences within its borders"
allows a fairly broad reach for the Sherman Act, conceivably including
a contractual sale of plant and know-how to a Soviet trade corporation
such as contemplated by the XYZ Corp.
Economic interdependence in the post-war period is of such a
character that almost any restrictive practice could qualify under the
Alcoa language. Judge Hand recognized this and suggested that Congress never intended that the antitrust laws should apply with
unreasonable breadth:
Two situations are possible. There may be agreements made beyond
our borders not intended to affect imports, which do affect them, or
11 See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690
(1962).
18 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
19 United States v. Sisal Sales Co., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
"1 United States v. Sisal Sales Co., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
22 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
'0
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which affect exports. Almost any limitation of the supply of goods in
Europe, for example, or in South America, may have repercussions
in the United States if there is trade between the two. Yet when one
considers the international complications likely to arise from an effort
in this country to treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe to
assume that Congress certainly did not intend the Act to cover them.
Such agreements may on the other hand intend to include imports
into the United States, and yet it may appear that they have had no
effect upon them. That situation might be thought to fall within the
doctrine that intent may be a substitute for performance in the case
of a contract made within the United States; or it might be thought
to fall within the doctrine that a statute should not be interpreted to
cover acts abroad which have no consequence here. We shall not
choose between these alternatives; but for argument we shall assume
that the Act does not cover agreements, even though intended to affect imports or exports, unless its performance is shown actually to
have had some effect upon them.
Both agreements would clearly have been unlawful, had they
been made within the United States; and it follows from what we
have just said that both were unlawful, though made abroad, if they
23
were intended to affect imports and did affect them.
Thus, Judge Hand suggests that Congress did not intend the Act to
cover situations where there is no intent to affect commerce and there
is an indirect effect. Where there i an intent to affect commerce, but
no effect results, Judge Hand defers judgment on whether the antitrust
laws apply. Judge Hand concludes his analysis by arriving at a two-part
standard: The antitrust laws will apply to those agreements which are
intended to affect imports or exports, and do, in fact, affect them.
Notwithstanding Judge Hand's analysis, other courts have altered
the standard. For example, a stricter test was employed in United
States v. General Electric Co., 24 wherein foreign and domestic manufacturers of incandescent lamps negotiated licenses and agreements to
establish territorial restrictions to minimize foreign competition in
domestic markets. The court conditioned liability under the Act upon
the requirement that the activities exercise a "direct and substantial effect" upon United States trade. At the same time, the court suggested
that "intent" to restrain trade need not be shown if the result occurs in
25
fact and as a consequence of the business arrangement.
23
-24
21

Id. at 443-44 (emphasis added).
82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
Id. at 891.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

Vol. 11: 117

A similar standard was applied in United States v. R. P. Oldham
Co.,26 although without discussion of the "intent" element. In response
to the question whether the court's jurisdiction could extend to a conspiracy to restrain trade which, for the most part, took place outside
the United States, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction where
the activities operated as a "direct and substantial restraint" on United
27
States commerce.
In contrast, the court in United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries28 articulated a standard requiring a lesser showing of effect on
United States commerce. Certain United States and British corporations had conspired to divide world markets in chemicals and explosives through patents and processes agreements, and they were
found to have violated Section One of the Sherman Act. The defendants argued that a decree of divestiture would be an extension of control beyond the court's jurisdiction. The court responded: "We are
directing that these defendants take definite action to remove restraints
of trade . . . because their concerted acts have, in part, been committed here and the result of their agreement has directly affected our
trade and commerce." 29 The court made no mention of the substantiality requirement.
The picture is even further obscured when one considers an old
decision by the Supreme Court which suggested that a mere effect
would justify application of the antitrust laws as against a domestic
steamship company which entered into a monopolistic arrangement
formed wholly abroad by foreign steamship lines.30
The clear distinction between a "direct" effect and a "substantial"
effect which exists with respect to interstate commerce has yet to be
made with respect to international commerce.3 1 It is clear that
2 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
27 Id. at 822.
28 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).

" Id. at 237 (emphasis added).
" Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 68 (1917). The decisions referred to in the
text do not represent the entire spectrum of legal standards which have been applied
by the courts. See generally J. VON KALINOWSKI, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation, in 16 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 5.02[2] at 5-124 nn. 22-25 (1978).
21 There is a clear and well-established difference between a "direct" effect and a
"substantial" effect upon interstate commerce. A direct effect arises when a restraint is

placed upon and limited to goods or services that flow in interstate commerce. The
effect is assumed from the fact that the restraint was directly applied to those goods or
services and does not have to meet any quantitative standards. A substantial effect, on
the other hand, justifies federal jurisdiction only if its quantitative effect on commerce
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restraints which "directly affect" United States foreign commerce are
subject to the Sherman Act. In the cases in which "substantially affect"
has been used, the term has been used in conjunction with "directly
affect." 3"
Some comment exists indicating that an indirect effect will not fall
afoul of Section One of the Sherman Act. In a report prepared under
the supervision of the United States Attorney General, a Committee
member's note on discussion of the term "restraints" stated:
No
Of course "restraints" must be direct as well as substantial ....
case has been found in which the court has applied the antitrust
statutes to activities of an American enterprise within a foreign country in the absence of its being a party to some concerted action in
direct and substantial restraint of the commerce of the United
3

States.

Indeed, there is some case law indicating that anything short of a
4
direct effect does not bring the activity within the Sherman Act.
Finally, one case, Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line,
Inc., 5 stands by itself in relation to the other foreign commerce decisions. It represents a break from the direct/substantial line of reasoning. In Pacfic Seafarers, the plaintiff had charged a conspiracy among
defendant American Shipping Lines and the two conferences to which
they belonged to destroy the plaintiffs business of carrying AIDfinanced cement and fertilizer cargoes between Taiwan and South

is sufficient. Whether an effect is substantial becomes relevant when a restraint indirectly affects goods and services in their interstate flow. J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra
note 30, at 5-124. Consistent with this view, von Kalinowski has said that "any effect
that is not both insubstantial and indirect will support Federal jurisdiction under Section 1." Id. at 5-125 n.31 and accompanying text. Given the complexity of the semantic debate involved, it is unlikely that the courts will soon move away from their present declarative standards of "direct" and "substantial" effect to embrace von
Kalinowski's more ambiguous negative standard.
12 See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying
text.
33 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 70 n.21 (1955).

See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F. 2d. 99, 105-06 (2d
Cir. 1951), where the court states:
So far as the evidence discloses, the output restriction was not imposed with
sales in the United States in mind. Accordingly, we take it that the restriction
was meant to have and did have, at most, only an incidental, peripheral,
reference to sales in the United States of America.
" 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
14
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Vietnam. The defendants first sought to erect legal barriers to stop the
plaintiffs from obtaining this shipping business and, when they failed
in that effort, they dropped their prices and drove the plaintiff out of
business. The Federal Maritime Commission dismissed the plaintiffs
complaint on the ground that this trade between foreign ports, of
goods owned and shipped by foreigners to foreigners, was not within
the Commission's jurisdiction under the Shipping Act. Subsequently,
the plaintiffs complaint under the Sherman Act was dismissed by the
District Court, presumably on the jurisdictional ground that the complaint made no allegation of restraint of United States foreign commerce. The Circuit Court, in rejecting the defendant's contention that
the Sherman Act is inapplicable unless United States foreign commerce
itself is restrained, stated:
[W]e hold that, since there is an identifiable, distinctive market for
American-flag shipping service where the American characteristic is
dominant-a market defined as involving the transportation of AIDfinanced cargoes, which has a definite nexus with significant interests
of the United States-the Sherman Act is applicable to a conspiracy
36
to exclude newcomers from the trade.
The Court was particularly influenced by the fact that the trade involved was entirely a product of the United States policy of subsidizing
its merchant marine and that all the parties had to be Americans to
participate in serving the market for American-flag shipping.
Pacific Seafarers contains the seeds of a potentially disturbing extension of the antitrust laws to facts which on their face don't appear
to restrain or substantially affect United States imports or exports. The
troublesome aspect of this decision is that it is an extension of the antitrust laws to apply to trade between foreign ports of goods owned
and shipped by foreigners to foreigners. The application of United
States antitrust laws to cases where the United States interest is less
than direct is fraught with problems. American leadership in asserting
jurisdiction internationally has been perceived as an invasion of the
sovereignty of other nations affected by our decisions. Recently the
British House of Lords declined to enforce letters rogatory issued
by a United States District Court for evidence which the House of
Lords felt was not subject to United States jurisdiction. Viscount
Dilhorne, reflecting his annoyance, stated:

16

Id. at 816.
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For many years now the United States has sought to exercise
jurisdiction over foreigners in respect of acts done outside the
jurisdiction of that country. This is not in accordance with international law and has led to legislation on the part of other States, including the United Kingdom, designed to protect their nationals
from criminal proceedings in foreign courts where the claims to
jurisdiction by those courts are excessive and constitute an invasion of
sovereignty. 31
The Antitrust Division has recently acknowledged its concern with the
problem of extraterritorial enforcement and has indicated that it is trying to increase its communications with foreign jurisdictions which may
8
be or which have been offended by such enforcement.a
The distinguishing characteristics of Pacific Seafarers are that the
Court treats the American shipping industry as the relevant market in
this case and that the United States Government financed the entire
program. The result that the shipping industry was less competitive
after the defendant's action than before, because the plaintiff had
been put out of business, finds no parallel in the proposed contractual
arrangement of the XYZ Corp. In addition, the case may be distinguished because it involves a peculiar and unique industry, an industry
which can earn payments that benefit the United States economy by
providing transportation services involving neither United States ports
nor United States products. Perhaps the best analysis of Pacfic
Seafarers was made by a member of the Antitrust Division when he
11 Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation and Others and Westinghouse Electric Corporation et e Contra, [1978] A.C. 547, Opinion of Viscount Dilhorne at 631. This view is
consistent with the attitude of Mr. Justice Holmes in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). In that case, United Fruit Company was alleged to
have induced the Costa Rican government to seize a competitor's banana crop land.
Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme Court, stated:
The general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as
lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country
where the act is done ....
For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to
lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather than
those of the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would
be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the
comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent. Id. at
356.
38 Address by Michael J. Egan, Assoc. U.S. Attorney General, before the
Business Law Section, International Bar Ass'n (Nov. 3, 1977), excerpted in Stanford,
The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States, 11
CORNELL INT'L L. J. 195, 208 (1978).
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suggested as its principle: "Where the U.S. Government is financing
the transactions involved and reserving the business to U.S. firms, we
have no national interest in having American firms restrain commerce
in that area." 3 9 Such a principle would not apply to a resale limitation
in a contract with a Soviet trade corporation.
2.

Standards suggested by the Antitrust Division
In its recent publication entitled Antitrust Guide for International
Operations (the Guide) the Antitrust Division describes two somewhat
different standards. The Guide states that United States antitrust law
should be applied to an overseas transaction when there is a substantial and foreseeable effect on United States commerce.4 0 However,
the cases cited as the source for this standard do not use the word
"foreseeable." 4 1 In fact, the only referenced articulation approaching a
standard of "substantial and foreseeable" effect is language used by
Learned Hand in the Alcoa case where he says, "[b]oth agreements
would clearly have been unlawful . . . if they were intended to affect
'42
imports and did affect imports.
The confusion resulting from the multiple standards suggested by
the Guide might have been avoided.
The standard "substantial and foreseeable" effect appears to be
different from and to require greater proof than the case law standard
"substantial and direct" effect. If this new wording is to be the new
standard applied, then henceforth the Antitrust Division will be looking for foreseeability where formerly they had not been concerned with
it. However, the Guide states at a different point: "[T]o apply the
Sherman Act to be a combination of United States firms for foreign
activities which have no direct or intended effect on United States consumers or export opportunities would . . . extend the Act beyond the
'4 3
point Congress must have intended."
This "direct or intended" effect language appears to refer
specifically to Learned Hand's statement quoted above, although Hand

19 Baker, supra note 15, at 32.
40 ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTER-

NATIONAL OPERATIONS 6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE]. For discussions of the ANTITRUST GUIDE, see Fugate, The Department of Justice's Antitrust
Guide For International Operations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 645 (1977); Seki, The Justice

Department's New Antitrust Guide for International Operations-A Summary and
Evaluation, 32 Bus. LAW 1633 (1977).
4' See ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 40, at 6 n.13.
41 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945)
(emphasis added).
43 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 40, at 7.
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used the conjunctive and the Justice Department has used the disjunctive. Whether the Antitrust Division would use the "substantial and
foreseeable" effect or the "direct or intended" effect standard is
unclear. However, both standards appear to require greater proof than
the "direct and substantial" effect standard. While both Justice Department standards appear to be drawn from the Alcoa opinion, intent
and foreseeability are not the same thing. It is likely than an intended
result would also be foreseeable but that a foreseeable result would not
necessarily be intended. The distinction between direct and substantial
44
is well established in United States domestic cases.
Section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States uses "direct and foreseeable" language, in conjunction with substantial, stating:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an
effect within its territory, if
(b) the effect within the territory is substantial, occurs as a
direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory, and
the prescribing of a rule of law with a view to preventing or
regulating such effect is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal
45

systems.
3.

Advantages of the Restatement Standard

The better standard for courts to follow and for Justice Department enforcement purposes is the standard established by the Restatement. The value of this standard is that it maximizes the effectiveness
of the law, focusing upon prohibiting acts which clearly violate the intent of the statute. Less demanding standards do not recommend
themselves as highly because they tend to violate the sovereignty of
other nations and because they fail to reflect the realities of international trade, leaving the American businessman at a competitive disadvantage.
The attempt to assert United States jurisdiction over actions of
American corporations in the international arena has resulted in
negative reactions by the sovereign states on whose sovereignty such
assertions impinge. Jurisdictional extensions by the United States are
44

See note 31 supra.

41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 18 (1965) (emphasis added); See also Fugate, supra note 40, at 652 n.40.
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perceived as judicial expressions of American hegemony. Jurisdictional
conflicts between the United States Government and foreign sovereigns
will probably increase rather than decrease in the future as the world
moves further away from a bi-polar to a multi-polar system. The
Restatement standard would minimize these conflicts.
In addition, it must be remembered that the concept of economic
competition reflected in the United States antitrust laws finds little
support in the laws of other nations. State-supported private monopolies and oligopolies and state monopolies and oligopolies dominate
most of the economies of the world. 4" The Restatement standard
would allow American corporations abroad to complete with foreign
corporations on the same footing.
Finally, while American multinationals may have dominated the
post-war international marketplace through the early 1960's, this condition no longer exists. The ascendancy of American corporations after
World War II was substantially a product of the course of the war. No
other major industrial center expanded production throughout the war
and sustained this expansion after the war. In fact, a large part of the
remainder of the industrialized world lay in ruins.The re-emergence of
the industrial centers of Europe and Japan as well as the development
of new centers such as India and Brazil have erased the dominant position of the United States multinational. In short, the world is entering
a period in which United States corporations will have to compete with
foreign multinationals which have newer infrastructures, cheaper labor
and significant state support. The viability of the American multinational will be sorely tested in the remainder of this century. The
Restatement standard would clearly establish the regulations which would
apply to American corporate activity abroad with an effect on United
States commerce. The resulting predictability and stability of applicable law would improve the competitiveness of the United States
multinational.
IV.

THE LIKELIHOOD OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
ACTION ON A RESTRICTION OF SALE

The most significant enforcer of the antitrust laws is the Justice
Department. Therefore, it is worth reviewing the perspective of the
46

Foreign Sovereigns can now use not only their Sovereign position to eliminate

United States competition, but they can also invoke the United States antitrust laws as
a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308
(1978), which gave foreign sovereigns standing to sue for treble damages under the
American antitrust laws.
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Antitrust Division on enforcement of the antitrust laws in the international sphere, including the cases they stress.
A.

Past Enforcement

In the international arena, the United States antitrust laws have
been enforced to achieve two objectives; to insure that American consumers receive the benefit of import competition and to protect the export opportunities of United States firms. 47 The history of Justice
Department prosecutions reflects both of these objectives.
1.

The classic international cartel cases-insuring import competition

The primary effort of the Justice Department in enforcing the antitrust laws in the international sphere has been to challenge classic international cartels. The typical arrangement in the international cartel
cases is that substantial firms in different countries agree not to compete in each other's home markets. 48 Thus, in United States v. National Lead Co., the District Court found that the doctrine validating
covenants in restraint of trade when reasonably ancillary to a lawful
principal purpose-such as a sale of a business-doesn't apply when
the United States corporation has no foreign markets to sell and the
foreign corporation has no United States markets to sell. 49 In addition,
in United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., a conspiracy to
divide up the world market was found illegal as being in restraint of
trade.5 0
In United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.," the Supreme
Court found to be unreasonable restraints established ostensibly as
steps to implement a valid trademark licensing system, because the
United States manufacturer entered into a business agreement
regulating the manufacture and sale of antifriction bearings. The
Court also found unreasonable the contention that Timken's activities
were legitimate joint ventures. Timken was dominant in its field, controlling seventy-to-eighty percent of the United States tapered roller
bearing output and twenty-five percent of all antifriction bearing out'

Baker, supra note 15, at 23, 27.

[1973] 5
'

TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)

63 F. Supp. 513, 524 (S.D.N.Y.

50,161 at 55,283.
1945), modified and affd, 332 U.S. 319

(1947).
50 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
,1 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modified and affd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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put from the United States. Timken was charged with long-term international allocation of markets with a British and French firm. 52 The
Justice Department alleged that Timken had allocated trade territories,
fixed prices on products sold, cooperated to protect markets, and participated in cartels to restrict imports to and exports from the United
States.5 3 The Supreme Court upheld the District Court's finding that
the trademark provisions were secondary to the central purpose of
54
allocating trade territories.
2.

Protecting export opportunities of United States firms

In addition to insuring import competition, the antitrust laws seek
to protect the export opportunities of United States firms. A number
of activities in the export field have been found suspect by the Justice
Department. Classic cartels which limit United States exports are unacceptable, 55 as are arrangements where American firms conspire to
5 6
drive another American firm out of the export market.
In United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 57 the
United States brought suit against Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing
Co. (3M Co.) and- others, seeking injunctive relief against a combination in restraint of foreign trade. The United States manufacturers
controlled four-fifths of the export trade in coated abrasives. They
conspired to establish joinly-owned factories abroad and to refrain
from exporting from the United States to countries in which products
of such foreign plants could be sold more profitably. The foreign factories also precluded United States competitors from receiving business
they might otherwise have received from the markets served by these
jointly-owned foreign factories. The United States District Court found
this to be a restraint of trade with foreign nations under Section One
of the Sherman Act.

52 Timken held 30 percent control over the British company and owned, with an
English business man, all of the stock of the French company. Id. at 294.
13 Id. at 287-88.
14 341 U.S.
at 598-99. The Justice Dept. has continued to attack agreements
which create an "aggregation of restraints." See Reeves, Antitrust and International
Technology Licensing: A Primer, 11 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 263, 269-70 (1978).
11 United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951).
16 See Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East, Lines, supra note 35, at 811.
Compare ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 40, at 5.
57 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
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Joint ventures formed by leading firms in an industry to export to a
foreign country may be illegal if they exclude other United States
firms, thus depriving them of the benefit of making export sales. 58 Exclusive long-term contracts between leading United States firms and
leading foreign customers may be illegal. The contract would be
scrutinized in terms of its competitive effect, with particular attention
given to the foreign buyer's importance in the total market of United
States exports.5 9 Foreign buying cartels which combine to allocate their
purchases among various United States sources limit competition
within the United States economy for exported goods and are also illegal. 60
B.

Public statements of the Antitrust Division

The Justice Department's Antitrust Division has indicated in a
number of instances that a contractual arrangement similar to the
XYZ Corp. hypothetical would probably not be a violation of the antitrust laws if it sought only to limit resale in Western Europe. A limitation of resale in the United States would fall afoul of the antitrust
laws. In a memorandum entitled "Concerning Antitrust and Foreign
Commerce", the Antitrust Division suggested a hypothetical case (Case
3) in which an American company would license technology to a
foreign corporation. The American company wished to provide that
the licensee could not sell the completed product in other countries.
The Antitrust Division Memorandum commented: "Restrictions on
sales in other foreign markets would not affect United States foreign
commerce and, therefore, not be subject to United States antitrust
jurisdiction. Consequently no problems under the United States an's
titrust laws would exist."'
Consistent with this view, Joel E. Davidow of the Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust Division stated before the Department
of Commerce Advisory Committee on East-West Trade on March 10,
1976: "If the purpose of a restriction is to prevent the licensee or
distributor in the Soviet Bloc from selling into Western Europe, there
probably is no issue under American antitrust law, for there is no intended or actual effect on American commerce. "62 Later in the ques11 Baker, supra note 15, at 28 n.31.
59 Cf. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 329 (1961).
60 Baker, supra note 15, at 29.
50,129 at 55,209-10.
61 [1972] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
62 U. S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, Supra note 2, at 4.
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tion period Mr. Davidow stated as an example: "If I sell to Russia with
an agreement not to sell to China, there is no United States conflict. I
'63
mean, it is just outside the scope of United States antitrust law.
Davidow encouraged the use of the Justice Department's Business
Review Procedures 64 in cases where United States participants seek to
ascertain the enforcement intentions of the Antitrust Division with
65
respect to a specific proposal.
The Davidow comments of March 1976 are a recent example of
what has been a public position of the Antitrust Division for some
time. 66 The Antitrust Division's commitment to this position has been
confirmed in the Guide. A new hypothetical case, similar in some
respects to Case 3 referred to above, is presented, entitled, "Case H:
Licensing a Non-Market (State-owned) Enterprise." The facts are as
follows:
An American company, FX Incorporated, has negotiated a license
agreement providing for transfer of unpatented technology to an
agency of X, a non-market economy country, for an extremely handsome price payable in dollars. The license covers know-how necessary
to manufacture a special chemical compound. A state enterprise in
Country X has exported to Western Europe automobiles manufactured under license from a Western European company which had
expected (but not required) sales to be confined to Country X. Furthermore, the automobiles are rumored to have been sold at a noncompensatory price. Accordingly FX writes into the license a prohibition against export to the United States or other Western Hemisphere
countries of products produced under the license.6 7
The Antitrust Division had no problem with export prohibitions to
Western Hemisphere countries. However, it did express concern about
export prohibitions to the United States, saying:
The focus of concern here is the prohibition on reexport back to
the United States of licensed products manufactured in Country X.
6- Id. at 16. Davidow also commented that it was "irrelevant" whether a foreign
buyer was a Communist or non-Communist country. Id. at 10. Therefore, we may

read "France" or "West Germany" for "China."
61

28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1977).

65 Id.
66 See [1973] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
50, 169; [1973] 5 TRADE REG.
(CCH) 1 50,160; [1972] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,129; [1973] 5 TRADE
REP. (CCH)
50,161.
67 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 40, at 40.

REP.
REG.

EAST-WEST TRADE AND SHERMAN ONE

1979

This prohibition does affect U.S. import competition. The prohibition on reexport to other Western Hemisphere countries does not
directly affect U.S. commerce and therefore probably raises no object68
ion under U.S. antitrust law.
The prohibition on re-export to the United States was further explained
in the following manner:
A know-how license may contain a limited territorial restriction
which is ancillary and limited in duration to the reverse-engineering
period, or some other specific period which the parties can establish
is justified by the facts of their situation.
We question . . . the permanent prohibition on sales into the

United States. We believe the licensor may have alternative means
available to protect it from the "unfair" advantage enjoyed by its
state-owned, non-market licensee. 69
The Guide stresses that the facts surrounding the relationship are
important in determining whether a violation will be found. Case law
supports this position. In Timken, when the defendants claimed their
combination was a joint venture, the Court rejected this contention
based on the fact that the District Court found that the dominant purpose of the restrictive agreements was to avoid competition.70 Similarly,
the Court found the defendants' trademark protection argument to be
unacceptable as the restrictions went beyond protecting a trademark.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Court rejected the contention that
what the defendants did was reasonable under their existing foreign
trade conditions. 7 The surrounding facts did not sustain Timken's
contentions.
Similarly, in the Westinghouse case, the Justice Department contends that the restrictions and royalty provisions in the WestinghouseMitsubishi agreements cover broader fields of commerce than the
scope of the technology transferred. The Justice Department also contends that the agreements establish territorial restrictions, compulsory
72
package licensing, and allocation of international markets.
68

Id.

69 Id. at 41.
70

341 U.S. 593, 597 (1951).

7, Id. at 599.

2 See [1973-2] Trade Cas.

74,712; [1974-2] Trade Cas.

75,312; see also

Brunsvold, The Effects of the Scott Amendments, If Enacted, on the Antitrust Action
filed against Westinghouse and the Mitsubishi Companies, in THE LAW AND BUSINESS

OF LICENSING 223 (Finnegan & Goldscheider eds. 1977).
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A short period of restriction on the sale of plant product in the
United States may be possible in certain circumstances. Any territorial
restriction should be ancillary to the primary purpose of the agreement.7 3 The length of time of a territorial restriction prohibiting resale
in the United States should be limited to the reverse engineering
period of the know-how unless special conditions exist. The reverse
engineering period is the time it would take the purchaser to develop
74
equivalent know-how on its own.
Special conditions which might justify a longer resale prohibition
are the size of the licensee relative to the purchaser and the size of the
investment. In the case of a small company selling to a large stateowned corporation which is making a large investment, a slightly
longer period might be justified. Thus, for example, if Mack Trucks,
Inc. had contracted to produce the Kama River Truck Project in the
Soviet Union, Mack might have been in a position to claim a longer
period for prohibiting resale in the United States.75 The Guide
specifically notes that "the availability or lack of effective alternative
remedies and the degree to which a United States enterprise is in fact
at an unfair disadvantage in dealing with a nonmarket enterprise may
be important in determining the legality of any competitive restraint.... .76
While resale in the United States should not be limited for more
than a short period in a contractual arrangement with a Soviet trade
organization, United States legislation limits abuses which might result
from Soviet entry into the United States market. First, if the processes
involved are patented in the United States, then resale in the United
States is effectively limited to those with licenses under the patent. Second, as long as Most Favored Nation (MFN) status is not granted to the
"3See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280-81 (6th Cir.
1898); United States v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 219 (D.
Del. 1953).
'4 See McLaren, Licensing Patents and Technology Under the United States
Antitrust Laws, 40 ANTITRUST L. J. 931, 936 (1971); see also Goldscheider, International Licensing from the American Point of View, in INTERNATIONAL LICENSING
AGREEMENTS 446 (Pollzien & Langen eds. 1973).
" For a description of the Kama River Project and Mack Trucks' role in it, see
Fitzpatrick, Soviet-American Trade, 1972-1974: A Summary, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 39, 45
(1974); see also Pearson, The Big Breakthrough in East-West Trade, Bus. WEEK, June
19, 1971, at 84.
76 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 40, at 41.

" Zakhmatov, Prospects for Economic Development, 49

INT'L AFF. 42 (1973).
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Soviet Union, the ability of Soviet-produced manufactured goods to compete will be limited. It has been estimated that granting MFN status will
reduce duties on certain goods by between fifty and seventy-five percent.77
In past years the debate over the linkage of Soviet immigration policy and
the granting of MFN status appears to have decreased the possibility of
granting the Soviet Union MFN status in the immediate future.7 8
Third, if and when the Soviet Union enters the United States market,
it will be subject to United States regulations with respect to dumping
and other anti-competitive practices which should limit predatory pric79
ing.
V.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the application of Section One of the Sherman Act
in the international arena remains unclear. Case law in the area is
limited. A rather poorly delineated group of standards is the sum total
of the case law that exists. Congress has not attempted to remedy this
problem and the Justice Department, in attempting to effectively respond to numerous business inquiries, is the only branch of the government which has provided businessmen with a useful set of examples for
purposes of avoiding antitrust problems in their international business
arrangements. The Antitrust Division states in the Guide two new standards which they may seek to apply in the future-the "substantial
and foreseeable" effect standard and the "direct or intended" effect
standard.80 Unfortunately, the Division has muddied the waters by
referring to two new standards whereas it might have laid the question
to rest by embracing the standard articulated in the Restatement. It
may be that the Antitrust Division is trying to ease the concern of the
United States business community by indicating that prosecutions will

The effect of MFN status depends a great deal on the product involved. See Trade Act
of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2431-41 (1976).
78 See Detente and Politics, N. Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1975, at 18, col. 7. Some indication of an improved political atmosphere here in recent months which may lead to
a new attempt to grant the Soviet Union MFN status is that Jewish emigration figures
have risen again and are expected to reach 30,000 this year. At the height of detente
in 1973 Jewish emigration was approximately 35,000; whereas, in 1977 it was 17,737.
Id., Dec. 1, 1978, at A-7, col. 1. In addition, higher level efforts to improve trade
relations have recently been undertaken. Id., Dec. 5, 1978, at D-13, col. 1. Of course,
these efforts must be put in the context of overall Soviet-American relations.
79 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71 (1976).
80 See notes 40-45 supra and accompanying text.
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be based on a higher standard. However, the derivation of the standards remains unclear, and anyone anticipating applying one of them
would do well to inquire as to its applicability through the business
review procedures of the Antitrust Division.
With respect to the hypothetical problem of XYZ Corp., under
both the case law standards and the hypotheticals in the Justice
Department's Guide, restrictions on resale in Western Europe appear to
be acceptable. Restrictions on resale in the United States for short
periods may be acceptable under the Guide and yet they may run
afoul of the unclear case law standards. Therefore, restrictions on
resale to the United States do not generally appear to be advisable.

